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COMMENTARY:
ORGANIZED PROFESSIONALS CAN BE EFFECTIVE
PRODUCERS
ROBERT M. TOBIAS*

Labor-management relations have been characterized by
employers' resistance to any incursion on their ability to make
unilateral decisions. The efforts of blue-collar employees to organize,
and, more recently, professional employees, have been vigorously
opposed. Management resistance has carried over into virtually all
labor-management relationships formed. Such relationships, for the
most part, may be characterized as adversarial, with employers
attempting to limit the scope of bilateral decision making and unions
digging in their heels.
As a result of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"),
1
blue-collar employees may organize and bargain collectively.
However, few employers have attempted to transform their labormanagement relationship from its historically adversarial nature to a
more collaborative one. There have been some exceptions, however.
The most prominent example of successful collaboration is the
relationship between the United Automobile Workers of America
("UAW") and the Saturn Division of General Motors. These parties
have negotiated a series of collective bargaining agreements that
provide for using the knowledge, skill, and abilities of the employees
in making what historically have been management decisions.
Saul Rubinstein conducted extensive research concerning the
UAW/Saturn labor-management relationship. 2 He found that this
collaborative labor-management relationship added value to General
Motors' performance by improving the quality of the decision
making, the speed of decision implementation, and the density of the
* Distinguished Adjunct Professor in Residence, American University School of Public
Affairs.
1. See 5 U.S.C. § 7102 (2000).
2. See Saul A. Rubinstein, The Impact of Co-Management on Quality Performance: The
Case of the Saturn Corporation,53 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 197 (2000).
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cross-organizational communications network.3 Rubinstein found
4
similar results in other "innovative" labor-management relationships.
Professional employees have experienced a fate similar to bluecollar workers. In The Transformationof the ProfessionalWorkforce,5
Professor Crain chronicles their journey from professionals who are
individual entrepreneurs to professionals who are commodities to be
purchased and governed by an employer.
Crain describes a social phenomenon that she calls the
"Taylorization" of professional employees. Fredrick Taylor's "one
best way" obligates the managers to create the most efficient work
process and plug in employees to do it. Employees check their
knowledge at the door. It is the "system" that creates efficiency, not
the use of worker knowledge; in this view, if you want more
productivity, reengineer the system. Crain observes that professional
employees have lost their status as the repository of specialized
knowledge that is used to plan and carry out their work processes. It
is now the employer who creates the work processes and standardizes
the tasks in the interest of maximizing its own profit.
Thus, professional employees are following in the footsteps of
their blue-collar counterparts, who as skilled craft artisans were once
independent entrepreneurs who later saw their functions Taylorized
and converted into "cogs and levers" of scientifically managed
production processes. When today's professional employees' self
image, honed by family, friends, and perhaps graduate school, is
based on having a voice in the decisions made and in what work
processes are used, meets the reality of the Taylorized workplace
described by Crain, there is anger, frustration, loss of productivity,
and sometimes collective action. Professional employees are seeking
to restore their loss of status and pay by organizing collectively and
voting for union representation. They face the same employer
resistance to organizing and creating collaborative labor-management
relationships experienced by the industrial workers of the past.
The private sector remains stuck on whether professional
employees will be allowed to organize. In National Labor Relations

3. Saul A. Rubinstein, Unions As Value-Adding Networks: Possibilitiesfor the Future of
U.S. Unionism, 22 J. LAB. RES. 581, 589 (2001).
4. See Saul A. Rubinstein, The Local Union Revisited: New Voices from the Front Lines,
40 INDUS. REL. 405 (2001).
5. Marion Crain, The Transformation of the Professional Workforce, 79 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 543 (2004).
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Board v. Kentucky River Community Care, Inc.,6 the Supreme Court,
at the behest of an employer, made it much more difficult for
employees who define themselves as professional and who
traditionally have been defined as professionals (e.g., nurses,
accountants, lawyers, doctors) to be represented by a union. The case
required the Court to reconcile the NLRA's definition of
"professional employee" as one whose work, inter alia, "involve[es]
the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment," with its definition
of supervisor as an individual whose exercise of supervisory authority
"requires the use of independent judgment." 7 The Board, prior to the
Kentucky River decision, had defined the respective boundaries of
"professional" and "supervisor" so that the category of professional
employee is not obliterated by the category of supervisor.8 The Board
distinguished the professional employee's use of ordinary
professional and technical judgment in directing lesser skilled
employees from the independent judgment the statue required for a
finding of supervisor status. The Court, however, disagreed with this
approach and expanded the definition of supervisor, sweeping large
numbers of heretofore professional employees into the supervisor
category, making them ineligible for union representation.
The Kentucky River decision means that the Board is now in
search of a legal theory to support its policy. Crain provides that
theory. She contends that the Taylorization of professional employees
means that professionals' tasks have become so standardized and
routinized that they lack the authority to use independent judgment
with respect to the work process required for supervisory status.
Alternatively, she maintains, the professional's work has become so
bureaucratically controlled that the professional directs the
performance of discrete tasks, but does not direct subordinate
employees on an ongoing basis. Crain concludes that because
professional employees have been deprofessionalized, they should be
included within the definition of employees 9 who may join unions that
negotiate the terms and conditions of their employment, and should
6. 532 U.S. 706 (2001).
7. Id. at 720-21.
8. Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, stated that a "tension" exists between the
definition of "supervisor" and "professional," but "we find no authority for suggesting that the
tension can be resolved by distorting the statutory language in the manner proposed by the
Board." Id. at 720 (quoting N.L.R.B. v. Health Care & Retirement Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 571,
581 (1994)) (internal citations omitted).
9. 29 U.S.C. § 152(12) (2000).
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not be included in the category of supervisor 10 that may not be
unionized.
I believe the Board and eventually the Supreme Court should
adopt Crain's theory because it both reflects the reality of the
workplace and is legally sound. Such a course of action will give
professionals and employers an opportunity to reshape their current
relationship to optimize the use of their knowledge rather than
assuming that efficiency can be achieved only through the
routinization so vividly described by Crain.
Peter Drucker points out in a Harvard Business Review article,
They're Not Employees, They're People," that in 1950, approximately
90 percent of the workforce was non-professional, "subordinates who
did as they were told."'12 Today 40 percent of workers are knowledge
workers and only 20 percent are non-professional. 3 This dramatic
change in the workforce requires a dramatic change in the way the
new knowledge worker workforce is managed:
In a knowledge-based organization... it is the individual worker's
productivity that makes the entire system successful. In a
in a knowledge
traditional workforce, the worker serves the system;
14
workforce, the system must serve the worker.
In a knowledge-based organization, it is therefore the individual
knowledge workers who must work differently to create more value
for their employers. We all have a stake in the maximization of
employee contribution to organizational effectiveness in this highly
competitive global environment. Based on past history, however, it is
unlikely that professional employees in an unorganized work place
will speak out and that employers will listen and act on the significant
change needed to maximize the contribution of knowledge workers.
The federal workplace provides an example of how organization
of professional employees, bred by their frustration with their
Taylorization, can lead to enhanced cooperation and improved
10. The term supervisor is statutorily defined, 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (2000), as:
any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer,
suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other
employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to
recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such
authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of
independent judgment.
11. Peter F. Drucker, They're Not Employees, They're People, HARV. Bus. REV., Feb.
2002, at 70.
12. Id. at 74.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 76.
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productivity. The federal work force has an even greater percentage
of knowledge workers than the private sector. Office of Personnel
Director Kay Coles James recently pointed out that in 1950, 70
percent of the federal white-collar work force was clerical, and in
2000, 70 percent was knowledge workers.15 Correlatively, 41 percent
of the federal work force had a bachelor's degree or higher in 2000,
up from 35 percent in 1990.16
Congress created the federal sector labor-management relations
program in the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978. It is modeled after
the NLRA. For example, the Federal Labor Relations Authority
("FLRA"), 17 analogous to the National Labor Relations Board,
determines appropriate units of recognition 8 and decides whether
labor practices are unfair.19 Unlike the NLRB, the FLRA uses a
special procedure 20 to adjudicate whether a matter is excluded from
21
bargaining by the statute's management rights clause.
The friction between the definitions of "supervisor" and
"professional" under the NLRA described by Crain has never been
litigated under the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations
Act 22 that governs federal sector labor-management relations. It is not
clear why the issue has not been litigated or what the result would be
if were to be litigated. 23 It is clear, however, that federal professional
employees are being organized and represented by unions in response
to the same forces pushing private sector professional employees to
seek union representation. And it is also clear that giving professional
employees' "voice" is the key to improved employee satisfaction and
employer productivity.

15. Kay Coles James, A Fresh Start for Federal Pay: The Case for Modernization 5 (U.S.
Off. of Personnel Mgmt., 2002).
16. Id. at 10.
17. 5 U.S.C. § 7104-05 (2000).
18. 5 U.S.C. § 7112 (2000).
19. 5 U.S.C. § 7116 (2000).
20. 5 U.S.C. § 7117 (2000).
21. 5 U.S.C. § 7106 (2000).
22. 5 U.S.C. § 7101 et seq. (2000).
23. The definition of a professional employee in the federal sector, 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(15)
(2000), substantively mirrors the definition used in the private sector. However, the definition of
a supervisor in the federal sector, 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(10) (2000), requires the "consistent"
exercise of independent judgment rather than the "exercise of independent judgment"
contained in 29 U.S.C. § 152(11). In addition, in the federal sector, an indicia of supervisor
status is that one "directs" employees, 5 U.S.C. § 7103 (a)(10), rather than "responsibly" directs
in the private sector, 29 U.S.C. § 152(11). Neither the Federal Labor Relations Authority nor
the courts have decided what the import is of these differences.
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Although knowledge workers have been difficult to organize in
the private sector, in the federal sector 57 percent of the white-collar
work force (853,000 employees) and 61 percent of the total workforce
(1,050,000 employees) are organized. 24 Of the total federal work force
that is eligible to be included in units of recognition, excluding
managers, supervisors, confidential employees, and those excluded in
the interest of national security," 80 percent have elected union
26
representation .
There are many examples of federal professional employees
struggling to have a voice in matters that would have been theirs to
determine in the past. The frustration of employees in not being
heard and the failure of employers to listen leads to successful union
organizing. This "threat to identity," the impetus for private sector
organizing described by Crain, is also present in the federal sector. A
few examples:
1. The Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") hired some of the best
accounting graduates to conduct audits of the largest U.S.
corporations. When some of the most talented were unable to get
their work classified at a level that reflected their skills, they
organized.
2. Doctors hired by the Food and Drug Administration to
conduct research were not given time to write and deliver peerreviewed research papers. They believed their standing in the
research community was diminished by their inability to write
and their frustration led to organizing.
3. The attorneys at the Securities and Exchange Commission
wanted more involvement in the process of deciding which cases
to prosecute and in developing the legal theories to be used to
support a prosecution. They organized for union representation.
4. The IRS had a practice of hiring attorneys to perform audits
of estate and gift tax returns; however, they classified the
attorneys as accountants, stripping them of the recognition of
their law degrees, because it was easier for the IRS to transfer
employees among divisions if they were classified as accountants.
The attorneys joined a union.
24. Office of Personnel Management, Union Recognition in the Federal Government as of
January 2001, at 44.
25. 5 U.S.C. § 7103(b).
26. National Performance Review, From Red Tape to Results: Creatinga Government that
Works Better and Costs Less 87 (1993).
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5. Accountants at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
wanted a role in redesigning the procedures they use to audit
banks. They sought such a role by organizing a union.
Crain describes the organizing impetus for the Social Security
Administration ("SSA") Administrative Law Judges ("AL") as a
"steady stream of SSA efforts to undercut the AL's judicial
independence and autonomy .... "217 1 spent a day with the SSA
Administrative Law Judges Association, the precursor organization
to formally seeking union representation. We discussed how for
many, becoming an ALJ was a long sought capstone of a legal career.
Instead of exercising discretion, however, the AlIJs were told how
many hearings to conduct every day, how many decisions to write at
what speed, and their secretaries were eliminated-unpleasant new
realities unilaterally created by the SSA. We also discussed whether
the Association should remain a traditional professional association
(akin to the American Bar Association), transform itself into a union
and seek recognition (akin to the National Education Association), or
affiliate with a larger union to increase its leverage. They chose the
third option.
Electing a union, however, does not guarantee that professional
employees' voices will be heard and utilized by employers. The
parties must create a collaborative labor-management relationship in
order to increase the chances that management will recognize the
need of knowledge workers to be heard, and that employees will
recognize an employer's need to make fast decisions. A collaborative
labor-management relationship provides an opportunity for each of
the parties to understand and accept the role of the other in order to
maximize their shared goals and objectives.
There is evidence that these mutual needs, if recognized and
addressed, can lead to increased productivity. The National
Partnership Council ("NPC"), 28 created by President Clinton, issued
27. Crain, supra note 5,at 595.
28. The NPC included individuals in the positions of Director of the Office of Personnel
Management; Deputy Secretary of Labor; Deputy Director for Management, Office of
Management and Budget; Chair, Federal Labor Relations Authority; Director, Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service; President, American Federation of Government
Employees; National President, National Treasury Employees Union; Secretary-Treasurer,
Public Employees Department, AFL-CIO; and two individuals named by the President: Edwin
Dorn, Under-Secretary for Management, Department of Defense; and George Munoz,
Assistant Secretary for Management, Department of Treasury. Exec. Order No. 12,871, 58 Fed.
Reg. 52,201 (Oct. 6, 1993). Executive Order 12871 was abolished by Exec. Order No. 13,203, 66
Fed. Reg. 11,227 (Feb. 22,2002).
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several reports that identified the significant improvements in agency

operations from agency/union collaborative labor-management
relationships. 29 The most definitive study of agency return on
investment from creating and maintaining a collaborative labormanagement relationship occurred in the United States Customs
Service. Booz-Allen and Hamilton ("BAH") balanced the specific

costs of "partnership management" against the cost savings of fewer
grievances and unfair labor practice charges, less time spent by the
parties at the bargaining table, and the benefits generated from
partnership activities, such as operational improvements and drug
seizures. In spite of including all of the start up costs and excluding
the long-term benefits, BAH concluded that for every $1.00 the

Customs Service invested, it received $1.25 in benefits.30
It is possible to have a constructive labor-management
relationship that benefits both professional employees and employers.
It is not clear whether employers will follow the few examples of
collaboration that have maximized the contribution of knowledge
workers and enterprise productivity. But, as Peter Drucker points
out, sub-optimizing the contribution of professional employees makes
us less competitive in the global market.

29. See the National Partnership Council's Report to the Presidenton Progress in LaborManagement Partnerships,issued in September 1995, October 1996, and December 1997. See
also Marick Masters, A Final Report to the NationalPartnershipCouncil on EvaluatingProgress
and Improvements in Agencies' OrganizationalPerformanceResulting from Labor-Management
Partnership 5 (Oct. 16, 2001). Masters concluded, inter alia, after studying sixty labormanagement partnership councils in eight agencies at fifty-four different locations covering
70,000 federal employees, that those partnership councils where unions believed they had an
effective voice led to both management and unions believing they collaboratively improved
agency performance.
30. Booze-Allen and Hamilton, Cost Benefit Analysis of the Labor-Management
Partnership7-8, 10 (Oct. 1998).

